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Inadequate and Inequitable: The Role of the Judiciary 
in Arkansas Education† 
David A. Terry∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee,1 the Arkansas 
Supreme Court declared the state educational funding scheme 
unconstitutionally inadequate and inequitable. The decision sparked 
widespread political debate regarding the proper constitutional role of 
the judiciary in such funding issues. Lake View III was the 
culmination of years of litigation and political controversy 
surrounding what many perceived as inadequate school funding, 
combined with a systematic failure of the State Government to follow 
its constitutional duty to educate Arkansas’ youth.2 After the 
decision, government officials scrambled to bring the system into 
constitutional compliance, hoping to avoid a showdown between the 
court and the other branches of State Government.3 The supreme 
 
 †  On May 31, 2007, after this Note’s submission for editing and publication, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court held that the State’s current educational funding system has been 
cured of constitutional infirmities. Lake View School Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County, Arkansas 
v. Huckabee, 2007 WL 1560547 (Ark. 2007). As such, the litigation and related issues 
discussed herein, particularly the projections and solutions for the future of Arkansas education, 
are no longer immediately relevant. However, the broader topics addressed by this Note, 
including the role of the courts in school funding litigation generally, remain pressing concerns 
for several states throughout the country with similar litigation that remains unresolved. The 
reader having been cautioned, this Note is presented in its unaltered form. 
 ∗ J.D. (2007), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law.  
 1. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View III), 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 
2002).  
 2. See id. (detailing the inadequate and inequitable history of the failed educational 
funding scheme).  
 3. For a brief overview of legislative and executive efforts to bring the system into 
constitutional compliance since the Lake View III decision, see Bradley D. Jesson and David 
Newbern, Special Masters’ Report to the Supreme Court of Arkansas (Apr. 2, 2004), 
http://www.courts.state.ar.us/lake%20view/report.pdf [hereinafter Masters’ Report I]; Jesson 
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court, through the use of Special Masters,4 retained supervisory 
control over subsequent legislative efforts to bring the system into 
constitutional compliance.5 The case grew out of a national judicial 
and political climate that witnessed many states struggling with 
similar issues, with differing judgments, remedies, and levels of 
judicial involvement.6 The future of Lake View III is critical for 
Arkansas, both because of the immediate practical ramifications on 
the school system itself and the case’s impact on the functionality and 
authority of the judiciary and its relationship to the other branches of 
State Government.7 
The Lake View III decision was the culmination of years of 
litigation surrounding educational funding.8 Following the heady 
days of integration, many poor school districts became increasingly 
frustrated with their plight. Unable to achieve a satisfactory 
legislative solution, school districts resorted to lawsuits to effect 
change in funding inadequacies and disparities. While the state 
constitution provides guarantees for education,9 court involvement 
has presented practical as well as constitutional issues for the state. 
This Note is organized to give the reader a basic understanding of 
the historical and contemporary judicial and political context of 
education litigation in Arkansas during the past two decades. 
Particular attention will be paid to the Lake View litigation and 
 
and Newbern, Special Masters’ Report to the Supreme Court of Arkansas (Oct. 3, 2005), 
http://courts.state.ar.us/lake%20view/ReportF.pdf [hereinafter Masters’ Report II].  
 4. See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.  
 5. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 142 S.W.3d 643 (Ark. 2004) (recalling 
mandate in the case); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 144 S.W.3d 741 (Ark. 2004) 
(first appointment of the Special Masters); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 210 S.W. 
3d 28 (Ark. 2005) (second recall of mandate and reappointment of the Special Masters).  
 6. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 440 (N.J. 1997); Guinn v. Legislature of 
State, 71 P.3d 1269, 1272–73 (Nev. 2003); Montoy v. Kansas, 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005). This 
Note will discuss these cases and compare them to the current Arkansas litigation. 
 7. Indeed, the level of direct supreme court involvement in the process to cure the 
constitutional defects in the educational system will profoundly affect the judiciary’s prestige. 
The difficult balancing between judicial overreaching and the continuation of the current 
unconstitutional system tacitly permitted by a disinterested court will be further discussed in the 
Proposal section of this Note. 
 8. See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Tucker v. 
Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 (Lake View I), 917 S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 1996); Lake View Sch. Dist. 
No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View II), 10 S.W.3d 892 (Ark. 2000).  
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subsequent legislative responses. This Note will also explore 
measures taken since Lake View III to bring the educational system 
into constitutional compliance, including two separate court 
appointments of Special Masters. It will also briefly examine 
politicians’ and commentators’ viewpoints on constitutional and 
political snares inherent in the role the Arkansas Supreme Court has 
taken in this litigation. Additionally, this Note will outline other 
jurisdictions’ respective judicial responses to similar litigation, for 
the purpose of providing helpful comparative and predictive value to 
the Arkansas controversy. 
This Note will propose legislative solutions that would 
successfully transform the current education system into 
constitutional compliance and will further examine the proper future 
role of the courts in adjudicating constitutional challenges to the 
school funding system, paying close attention to possible judicial 
remedies to correct the unconstitutional system. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The DuPree Case 
The Arkansas Supreme Court signaled its duty to adjudicate the 
constitutionality of the school funding scheme nearly twenty years 
before Lake View III. In DuPree v. Alma School District No. 20,10 the 
court declared unconstitutional the school funding system in place at 
that time.11 The court acknowledged inherent inequality in funding 
among school districts,12 applying the equal protection clause of the 
Arkansas Constitution13 to the State’s general constitutional mandate 
 
 10. DuPree, 651 S.W.2d 90.  
 11. Id. 
 12. The court accepted the plaintiffs’ arguments that the “obvious disparity in property 
wealth” among the districts necessarily leads to funding disparities in a regime which relies 
heavily on local property taxes. Id. at 95. Indeed, the regime relying on local tax bases as the 
school’s funding system bore “no rational relationship to the educational needs of the individual 
districts, rather . . . [it] only promotes greater opportunities for the advantaged while 
diminishing the opportunities for the disadvantaged.” Id. at 93. 
 13. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. The full text of the free school system clause of the 
Arkansas Constitution reads:  
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to provide a “general, suitable and efficient education.”14 Thus, 
DuPree serves as an important precedent for the Lake View III case, 
starting the court down the road toward a more sweeping declaration 
of school funding unconstitutionality, on both inadequate and 
inequitable grounds.15  
B. The Beginnings of the Lake View Case and Subsequent 
Legislation 
In August of 1992, several plaintiffs16 sued State officials,17 
seeking “a declaration that the school-funding system was 
unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the 
Arkansas Constitution” and “an injunction against implementing the 
unconstitutional system.”18 In November of 1994, chancery Judge 
Annabelle Imber held that the school funding system violated both 
the education article19 and the equality provisions20 of the Arkansas 
 
Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a free and 
good government, the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system 
of free public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the 
advantages and opportunities of education. The specific intention of this amendment is 
to authorize that in addition to existing constitutional or statutory provisions the 
General Assembly and/or public school districts may spend public funds for the 
education of persons over twenty-one (21) years of age and under six (6) years of age, 
as may be provided by law, and no other interpretation shall be given to it. 
Id. The court, in its equal protection rationale, held that sufficient funding among school 
districts alone does not satisfy the constitution; equity must still be achieved. DuPree, 651 
S.W.2d at 93. “Bare and minimal sufficiency does not translate into equal educational 
opportunity.” Id. This portion of the DuPree decision played an important role in the Lake View 
III rationale, establishing the constitutional importance of equity in public schools. Lake View 
III, 91 S.W.3d at 497. 
 14. DuPree, 651 S.W.2d at 93 (quoting ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1). This represents a 
powerful confluence of two facially disparate constitutional provisions, paving the way to the 
bipartite compliance trial (examining both adequacy and equity) in Lake View III.  
 15. Lake View III refers to DuPree as “the seminal school-funding case.” Lake View III, 
91 S.W.3d at 494. 
 16. Lake View School District No. 25, school district officials, and certain individuals 
residing in Phillips County, Arkansas. Id. at 477. 
 17. The Governor of Arkansas, the State Treasurer, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, the President of the Senate, officers in the State Department of Education, and 
the State Board of Education. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
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Constitution.21 Judge Imber stayed entering her order for two years to 
allow the Arkansas General Assembly time to make necessary 
changes to bring the educational funding system into constitutional 
compliance.22 The plaintiffs appealed to the Arkansas Supreme 
Court, which dismissed the appeal because Judge Imber’s order was 
not a final appealable order.23 
Despite intervening legislation designed to correct constitutional 
flaws in the school funding system,24 the Lake View litigation 
proceeded.25 On August 22, 1996, following the plaintiffs’ filing of 
their fourth amended complaint, the trial court certified the Lake 
View class.26 On August 17, 1998, the trial court27 dismissed Lake 
 
inalienable rights, amongst which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and reputation; and of pursuing their own 
happiness.” Id. art. II, § 2. “The equality of all persons before the law is recognized, and shall 
ever remain inviolate; nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity; 
nor exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition.” Id. art. 
II, § 3. “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or 
immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Id. art. II, 
§ 18. 
 21. This decision followed a compliance trial. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Ark. 
2002). According to Judge Imber, the system did not violate the United States Constitution. Id. 
 22. Lake View I, 917 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Ark. 1996). See also Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 
477. 
 23. Lake View I, 917 S.W.2d at 531. It was not a final appealable order because the two-
year stay was still in effect. Id. See also Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 477. At the expiration of 
the two-year stay issued by Judge Imber, near the end of 1996, neither party appealed from her 
1994 order. Id. 
 24. During its 1995 Session, the General Assembly approved for popular referendum 
Amendment 74 (amending ARK. CONST. ART. XIV, § 3) to the Arkansas Constitution, which 
the voters ultimately approved in November 1996. The Amendment fixed a uniform property 
tax rate of 25 mills for each school district and permitted local increases in these millage rates 
to enhance public education. This amendment represents an embodiment of the public’s desire 
to retain some moniker of local control over the school districts during the controversial 
ongoing Lake View litigation. 
 25. Much of the legislation before Lake View III concentrated on increasing funding for 
schools. See 1995 Ark. Acts 916 (levying tax surcharge for the equalization of public school 
funding); Equitable School Finance System Act of 1995, 1995 Ark. Acts 917 (repealing old 
funding system and requiring Board of Education to review minimum standards and develop 
definition of adequate education) (codified in part at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-17-1001, 20-319, 
26-80-110 (Lexis Nexis 2005)); 1995 Ark. Acts 1194 (appropriating funds to school districts) 
(codified in part at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-20-319, 7-1001, 5-303 to 306, repealed by 1995 Ark. 
Acts 1194 § 30 (Lexis Nexis 2005)); 1997 Ark. Acts 1307 (amending ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-
20-302, 303, 306 to 311, 323, 401 (Lexis Nexis 2005)); 1997 Ark. Acts 1361 (appropriating 
funds to school districts). 
 26. The class included all school districts in the state, students and parents of students 
statewide, all school board members, and school district taxpayers who supported the system. 
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View’s fourth amended complaint.28 However, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court reversed, remanding the matter for a compliance trial “as soon 
as is practicable” regarding the constitutionality of the post-1994 
legislative acts.29 
1. The Lake View III Compliance Trial 
Before the 2000 compliance trial,30 the trial court denied motions 
by 144 school districts that sought to intervene in the litigation and 
align themselves with the State’s position that the post-1994 
legislation31 had cured the constitutional deficiencies.32 Two weeks 
before the trial, Judge Kilgore announced that the court would focus 
on the issues of inequity33 and inadequacy.34 The compliance trial 
 
Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 478. 
 27. In January 1997, Judge Imber assumed her new role as an Associate Justice of the 
Arkansas Supreme Court. Chancery Judge Collins Kilgore was subsequently assigned the Lake 
View case and presided over the 2000 compliance trial. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 478 n.4 
(Ark. 2002). 
 28. The trial court, presuming legislation to be constitutional, dismissed the compliant on 
the grounds that Amendment 74 and various legislative acts in 1995 and 1997 had implemented 
a new standard for public school funding. Id. at 478; see supra notes 24–25.  
 29. Lake View II, 10 S.W.3d 892, 900 (Ark. 2000). This compliance trial formed the basis 
of the subject of the Lake View III decision. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 478. The court held 
that “[i]t would take an extraordinary leap of faith to assume that the mere passage of a new 
school funding formula resolves all issues relating to disparities in the school funding system 
set out in the 1994 Order.” Lake View II, 10 S.W.3d at 899. Dismissing the case, as the trial 
court did, would effectively preclude subsequent litigation regarding the constitutionality of 
legislation passed in 1995 and 1997, and the Lake View case “cries for finality and resolution.” 
Id. at 901. 
 30. As ordered by Arkansas Supreme Court. Id. at 900. 
 31. In the meantime, the General Assembly during its 1999 session appropriated funds for 
public education totaling more than $3.3 billion for the biennium. See 1999 Ark. Acts 1392 
(appropriating funds to school districts). The General Assembly also established the Arkansas 
Comprehensive Testing Assessment and Accountability Program to assess and evaluate 
academic progress and performance in the public schools with an emphasis on reading, writing, 
literacy, and mathematics from the earliest grades. Arkansas Comprehensive Testing, 
Assessment, and Accountability Program Act, 1999 Ark. Acts 999 (codified at ARK. CODE 
ANN. §§ 6-15-401 to 407, 1003 (Lexis Nexis 2005)). These legislative improvements in 
education became issues in the forthcoming compliance trial. See Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 
478–79. 
 32. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 479. 
 33. The Lake View III court employs the terms “inequity” and “inequality” 
interchangeably; e.g., “we quickly discern inequality in educational opportunities.” Lake View 
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lasted for nineteen days in September and October of 2000 and ended 
with Judge Kilgore declaring the current school funding system 
unconstitutional on the twin grounds of inadequacy under the 
education article35 and inequality under the equality provisions36 of 
the Arkansas Constitution.37 The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Lake 
View III decision was a direct appeal from Judge Kilgore’s ruling.38 
The State appealed the constitutionality of this order, and the 
plaintiffs also appealed to the supreme court.39  
2. The Lake View III Decision 
The State contended that the school funding system presented 
nonjusticiable questions, since the constitutionality of the school 
system is properly left to the other branches of government.40 The 
 
the school funding scheme is inequitable by pointing out various inequalities in educational 
opportunities throughout the state). 
 34. David R. Matthews, Lessons from Lake View: Some Questions and Answers from 
Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 56 ARK. L. REV. 519, 522 (2003); see also Lake 
View III, 91 S.W.3d at 479 (discussing the twin foci of the 2000 compliance trial). This move 
surprised many participants in the case, who believed that the trial would focus only on the 
issue of inequality. See Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 479; cf. Lake View II, 10 S.W.3d 892, 899–
900 (Ark. 2000) (discussing the need and purposes for a compliance trial, seemingly focusing 
exclusively on inequity). 
 35. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.  
 36. Id. art. II, §§ 3, 18.  
 37. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 479. Conducting a trial for these two issues was not 
insignificant, since the adequacy issue caused many richer school districts to be aligned with the 
poorer ones, in order to seek an increase in overall funding. See id. at 479–80 (discussing the 
posture of the parties). 
 38. The Lake View III court determined that the case it was reviewing was Judge 
Kilgore’s 2001 order, instead of Judge Imber’s 1994 order, reasoning that Judge Kilgore’s 
compliance trial was intended to determine “whether the post-1994 legislation and Amendment 
74 had corrected the constitutional deficiencies [found by Judge Imber].” Id. at 482.  
 39. The plaintiffs’ appeals included challenging the failure of the trial court to hold the 
State in contempt of court for failure to comply with Judge Imber’s 1994 order and failure to 
order specific remedies. Id. at 479. The controversy over attorneys’ fees will not be discussed in 
this Note.  
 40. The State argued that “courts unduly interfere and even usurp legislative and 
executive branch functions when they declare school-funding systems unconstitutional.” Lake 
View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 482–83 (Ark. 2002). The State cited the following constitutional 
provisions: “The powers of the government of the State of Arkansas shall be divided into three 
distinct departments. . . .” and “[n]o person or collection of persons, being of one of these 
departments, shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances 
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.” ARK. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2.  











252 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 25:245 
 
 
supreme court, however, asserted that this justiciability issue was 
effectively laid to rest41 by its previous decision in DuPree, which the 
court followed as binding precedent.42 The court further observed that 
the Arkansas Constitution specifically designates the entire State 
Government, rather than only the General Assembly, as the entity 
whose constitutional charge it is to maintain a “general, suitable, and 
efficient system of free public schools[.]”43 The court therefore 
assumed its equal role with the other branches of State Government 
in maintaining the constitutionality of the school funding system. 
Rejecting the State’s arguments that the court should not review 
school funding because legislative acts are presumed constitutional, 
the court harshly responded that “[t]his court’s refusal to review 
school funding under our state constitution would be a complete 
abrogation of our judicial responsibility . . . [w]e refuse to close our 
eyes or turn a deaf ear to claims of a dereliction of duty in the field of 
education.”44 Indeed, the court avowed its constitutional duty to 
adjudicate controversies regarding the constitutionality of school 
funding,45 opining that the State46 has an “absolute duty to provide 
the school children of Arkansas with an adequate education.”47 Thus, 
by dismissing the justiciability issues, while vindicating its active role 
 
 41. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 483. 
 42. DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983). 
 43. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 484 (citing ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1). “The people of 
this state [when adopting the current constitution] unquestionably wanted all departments of 
State Government to be responsible for providing a general, suitable, and efficient system of 
public education to the children of this state.” Id. at 484 (emphasis added). The court analyzed 
the language of the four preceding Arkansas Constitutions, determining that all of them stated 
that “the General Assembly would provide for public education.” Id. (emphasis added). See 
ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. VII; ARK. CONST. of 1861, art. VII, § 1; ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. 
VIII; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, §1. “In [the current constitution of] 1874, however, that 
duty was expressly shifted to the State, which signaled, in our judgment, a deliberate change.” 
Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 484 (emphasis added). The court’s willingness to decide this case 
affirms the DuPree principle that “the responsibility for maintaining a general, suitable and 
efficient school system falls upon the state.” DuPree, 651 S.W.2d at 95 (emphasis added). 
 44. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 484. 
 45. Id. at 492–95. 
 46. “[E]ducation has always been of supreme importance to the people of this state.” Lake 
View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 492 (Ark. 2002).  
 47. Id. at 492 (emphasis added). See also supra note 43 (discussing the role of the entire 
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in the matter, the court was able to address the substantive issues on 
appeal. 
a. Adequacy 
The State asserted that the trial court should not have issued 
rulings regarding adequacy, contending that the compliance trial was 
ordered only under the equality provisions48 of the Arkansas 
Constitution.49 The Arkansas Supreme Court swiftly rejected this 
argument, holding that it had remanded the case for a compliance 
trial to determine “whether the post-1994 legislation had satisfied the 
two constitutional deficiencies underscored by Judge Imber in her 
1994 order,” a criterion that included a decision on adequacy.50 
The State also contended that adequacy is “impossible to 
define.”51 In response, the court pointed out the failure of the State to 
follow the directive of the General Assembly to order an adequacy 
study,52 which was “extremely troublesome and frustrating to [the] 
court, as it must be to the General Assembly.”53 Citing two 1997 Acts 
from the General Assembly setting forth goals of statewide 
education,54 the court determined that “the General Assembly is well 
on the way to defining adequacy while the [State] Department of 
Education . . . has been recalcitrant.”55 Therefore, the court turned to 
 
 48. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
 49. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 486. There is “considerable overlap between the issue of 
whether a school-funding system is inadequate and whether it is inequitable.” Id. at 496. 
Adequacy measures basic quality of education; equity compares school districts to each other. 
Id.; cf. Lake View II, 10 S.W.3d 842, 899–900 (Ark. 2000) (discussing the need and purposes 
for a compliance trial, seemingly focusing exclusively on inequity). 
 50. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 486. “Judge Imber had concluded that the school-funding 
system failed as inadequate under Article 14 and inequitable under Article 2 of the Arkansas 
Constitution.” Id. 
 51. Id. at 486. 
 52. “The State Board shall seek public guidance in defining an adequate education . . . .” 
Equitable School Finance System Act of 1995, 1995 Ark. Acts 917 (repealing old funding 
system and requiring Board of Education to review minimum standards and develop definition 
of adequate education) (codified in part at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-17-1001, 20-319, 26-80-110 
(Lexis Nexis 2005)). 
 53. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 486 (Ark. 2002). 
 54. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-20-302(c)(4)(A) (Lexis Nexis 2005); Arkansas Public Education 
Act of 1997, § 3, 1997 Ark. Acts 1108 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-15-1003(a) to (c) 
(Lexis Nexis 2005)). 
 55. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 487. Indeed, the State Department of Education had not 
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another jurisdiction’s seven-factor definition of an “efficient”56 
education, undercutting the State’s original assertion that adequacy is 
impossible to define.57  
The State also pointed out the lack of a correlative relationship 
between enhanced school funding and increased student 
performance.58 The court responded by enumerating the “abysmal 
rankings” of various components of Arkansas’s educational system, 
holding that poor student performance essentially demands that 
something must be done to remedy the situation.59 The court cited the 
testimony of the Director of the Department of Education stating that 
higher teacher salaries are needed to achieve higher student test 
 
ordered an adequacy study nor set forth an adequacy standard, failing to keep up with the 
General Assembly’s efforts to define adequacy with precision. In short, the State’s adequacy 
argument failed simply because no significant efforts to define adequacy itself had been taken. 
Id. at 486. 
 56. The Arkansas Supreme Court did not comment on the relationship between 
“adequate” and “efficient,” but appeared to adopt the efficiency factors set forth by the 
Kentucky Supreme Court as equally applicable to adequacy. See infra note 57. 
 57. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 487–88. The court employed the seven factors set forth 
by the Kentucky Supreme Court: 
We concur with the trial court that an efficient system of education must have as its 
goal to provide each and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) 
sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a 
complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, 
social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices, (iii) 
sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand 
the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-
knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient 
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and 
historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either 
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work 
intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable 
public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding 
states, in academics or the job market. 
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).  
 58. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 488.  
 59. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 488. The court listed, inter alia, poor rankings in per 
capita government expenditures for education, standardized test scores, percentage of adult high 
school graduates, percentage of adult college graduates, percentage of adults with graduate 
degrees, non-proficiency in math, reading, science, and writing, per-pupil revenue, and teacher 
salary. Id. at 488–89. The court did not comment, however, on whether these rankings 
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scores.60 The court acknowledged what already appeared self-evident: 
that more money would help cure defects in Arkansas’s public school 
system. 
b. Equity 
The court addressed the politically explosive issue of equity 
among State school districts.61 The court, despite the State’s 
arguments to the contrary,62 accepted the trial court’s finding of fact 
regarding inequity among school districts.63 The court identified “the 
measuring rod for equality” to be the actual per-student expenditures 
by State Government.64 Using such a standard, the court found “self-
evident” inequality in educational opportunities.65 The court noted 
differences in school districts’ curricula66 and facilities.67 
Additionally, inequality in teachers’ salaries among school districts 
causes teacher migration away from poor districts.68 In fact, the 
school funding system has itself “fostered . . . discrimination” against 
poor school districts.69 
 
 60. Id. at 489. 
 61. The equity issue has the potential of dragging down richer school districts, by forcing 
them to spend less on education to achieve equity with poorer districts. 
 62. Pointing out the complexities in any definition of “equitable,” including the divergent 
needs for both horizontal equity in per-student expenditures and vertical equity to assure equal 
opportunities for special needs students, the State argued that “it is virtually impossible to 
equalize all revenues when special needs come into play and when certain value judgments 
must be made.” Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 495. 
 63. Id. at 497. “For some districts to supply the barest necessities and others to have 
programs generously endowed does not meet the requirements of the constitution.” Id. (quoting 
DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983)). 
 64. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 497.  
 65. Id.  
 66. The court contrasted the differences in the “barebones” curriculum of the Lake View 
and Holly Grove School Districts with the “rich curriculum” of the Fort Smith School District. 
Id. 
 67. Brushing aside arguments that more money does not solve all educational problems, 
the court stated, “[w]hether a school district has rainproof buildings, sufficient bathrooms, 
computers for its students, and laboratory equipment that functions is all a matter of money.” 
Id. at 497–98.  
 68. Id. at 498. “[M]otivated teachers, sufficient equipment to supplement instruction, and 
learning in facilities that are not crumbling or overcrowded, all combine to enhance educational 
performance.” Id. at 499. 
 69. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 499. Even though Amendment 74 does allow for 
disparities in millage rates among school districts, it “does not authorize a system of school 
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c. Stay of the Court’s Order and Subsequent Legislation 
The court stayed its order in the case until January 1, 2004, 
pending subsequent school funding legislation.70 The 2003 General 
Assembly passed a bill authorizing an adequacy study of the school 
funding system.71 The General Assembly also raised teachers’ 
minimum salaries, but the measure did not affect teachers already 
earning more than the minimum.72 The General Assembly also 
created a program designed to identify, assess, and address school 
districts in fiscal distress.73 Additionally, the legislature changed the 
basis of the State’s funding formula from per-district to per-student 
calculations.74  
C. Recalling the Mandate and Appointment of the Special Masters 
On January 22, 2004, the Arkansas Supreme Court recalled its 
mandate in Lake View III.75 Days later, the court appointed two 
Special Masters in the case, Bradley D. Jesson and David Newbern.76 
The court explicitly set forth the Masters’ task, directing them to 
evaluate the steps taken by the State since Lake View III to correct the 
unconstitutional school funding formula.77 
 
funding that fails to close the gap between wealthy school districts . . . and poor school 
districts.” Id.  
 70. Id. at 510. 
 71. 2003 Ark. Acts 94. The General Assembly, however, did not follow all of the 
adequacy study’s recommendations, including failing to raise teachers’ salaries by the 
suggested 10%. See Masters’ Report I, supra note 3, at Question 1, 12. 
 72. Public School Funding Act of 2003, 2004 Ark. Acts 59 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. 
§§ 6-20-2001 to 2006, 17-2401 to 2405, 23-501 (Lexis Nexis 2005)). 
 73. The Quality Education Act of 2003, 2003 Ark. Acts 1467 (codified at ARK. CODE 
ANN. §§ 6-15-202, 203, 206 to 209, 423 to 431, 20-1901 to 1911, and amending 15-401 to 404, 
406, 419 to 421, 423 to 431, 13-1403 to 1405, 1409, 1410 (Lexis Nexis 2005)).  
 74. Public School Funding Act of 2003, supra note 72. 
 75. “Because of noncompliance with the November 21, 2002, opinion of this court [Lake 
View III], we recall our mandate in this case forthwith.” Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. 
Huckabee, 142 S.W.3d 643, 644 (Ark. 2004). 
 76. Jesson is a former Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court. Lake View Sch. Dist. 
No. 25 v. Huckabee, 144 S.W.3d at 742. Newbern is a former Justice of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court. Id. 
 77. The court commanded the Masters to “examine and evaluate legislative and executive 
action taken since [Lake View III], to comply with . . . the constitutional mandate that the State 
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In a lengthy Report, the Masters addressed several issues 
involving the school funding scheme.78 The Masters endorsed this 
definition of “adequacy”: “[A]n amount of revenue per pupil 
enabling a student to acquire knowledge and skills specified by 
public officials as necessary to participate productively in society and 
to have an opportunity to lead a fulfilling life.”79 Generally, the 
Masters approved of the steps taken by the General Assembly since 
the Lake View III decision to bring the system into constitutional 
compliance.80 
The Arkansas Supreme Court again recalled its mandate in the 
Lake View III case on June 9, 2005, reappointing Special Masters 
 
suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education.’” Id. 
(quoting ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1).  
 78. Masters’ Report I, supra note 3. The Masters addressed ten issues related to school 
funding: (1) the adequacy study prepared for the General Assembly and the steps taken by that 
body to implement the study; (2) steps taken by the State to put in place a system to assess, 
evaluate, and monitor public school curricula offered in all primary and secondary schools in 
the State; (3) steps implemented by the State to assure a substantially equal curriculum is made 
available to all school children in the State; (4) steps taken by the State to assess and evaluate 
public school buildings and educational equipment across the State; (5) steps taken by the State 
to implement measures to assure that substantially equal school buildings and school equipment 
are available to all school children in the State; (6) measures in place to assure that teacher 
salaries are sufficient to prevent the migration of teachers from poorer school districts to 
wealthier school districts or to neighboring states; (7) accountability and accounting measures 
in place for the state to determine per-pupil expenditures and how money is actually being spent 
in local districts; (8) accountability and testing measures in place to evaluate the performance 
and rankings of Arkansas students by grade, including in-state, regionally, and nationals; (9) 
measures taken by the General Assembly to enact a school funding formula and to fund it so 
that the school children of the State are afforded an adequate education, and a substantially 
equal educational opportunity so as to close the gap between wealthy school districts and poor 
school districts; and (10) measures taken by the General Assembly to assure that funding 
education is the priority in the budgetary process. Id.  
 79. Id. at 5. This definition, derived from an expert witness’ testimony at the 2000 
compliance trial, came “as close to being useful as any . . . .” Id. Note that this definition is 
itself vague, and such a definition “must necessarily vary with the state of education art and 
science.” Id. 
 80. “[M]uch well-intentioned legislation and regulation are now in place in response to 
the court’s decision, and more implementing regulation by the Arkansas Department of 
Education is to follow.” Id. at 11–12. However, “the important changes will take time to 
implement and more time to assess after they have been implemented.” Id. Incidentally, the 
Masters addressed school consolidation, a subject not directly mentioned the supreme court, 
pointing out that it will have undeniable positive effects on administrative expenses and quality 
of curriculum. Id. at 7–10. The Masters again addressed consolidation in their second Report. 
See infra note 92. 











258 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 25:245 
 
 
Jesson and Newbern.81 The Masters released their second report on 
October 3, 2005.82 After a detailed explanation of the state education 
funding formula,83 the Special Masters presented findings of fact 
relevant to the issues raised by the parties and overall evaluations on 
the steps taken since their last report.84 
The Masters concluded that “the state has not lived up to the 
promise made by the 84th [2003] General Assembly . . . to make 
education the state’s first priority.”85 The Masters roundly criticized 
the General Assembly for failing to raise the per-pupil funding 
amount to take into account considerations such as inflation.86 Also, 
 
 81. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 210 S.W.3d 28 (Ark. 2005). The court 
recalled its mandate upon motions by more than forty school districts, alleging that they could 
not provide constitutionally adequate educations to their students because of the General 
Assembly’s alleged noncompliance with certain obligations undertaken in the 2003 legislation. 
Id. The Masters were originally required to complete their report by September 1, 2005. Id. 
However, they requested and were granted an extension until October 1, 2005. Lake View Sch. 
Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 211 S.W.3d 543 (Ark. 2005). 
 82. Masters Report II, supra note 3. 
 83. The school funding formula is only obliquely relevant to the topic of this Note, which 
is to examine the judicial role in determining the constitutionality of school funding regimes, 
not the regimes themselves.  
 84. Masters’ Report II, supra note 3, at 3. For the purposes of this Note, the findings of 
fact themselves are not of pertinent interest, but the Masters’ evaluation of these facts in light of 
the constitutional and statutory requirements for education in Arkansas is of paramount 
importance. 
 85. Id. at 72. Apparently completely accepting testimony from school superintendents, the 
Masters wrote, “Without exception, the school superintendents who testified before us were of 
the opinion that regression in state-aid funding, costly unfunded new education mandates, and 
the General Assembly’s failure to take inflation sufficiently into account had adversely affected 
their efforts to provide an ‘adequate’ education to their students.” Id. 
 86. Id. at 73–74. The General Assembly’s failure to raise the foundation funding amount 
from $5400 in 2005–2006 is “difficult to defend”:  
The predictable rise in the cost of items such as textbooks, food served in school 
cafeterias, and general supplies would have justified a cost-of-living increase. Also, an 
increase in foundation funding should have been forthcoming due to new spending 
requirements placed upon the school districts by the 85th General Assembly [such as 
hiring music and art teachers, vision-screening personnel and equipment, duty-free 
lunch periods for teachers, and forty-minute preparation time for teachers].  
Id. at 74. Furthermore, the Masters pointed out that the General Assembly enacted “cost-of-
living increases for other state agencies, but there was no increase for the school districts for 
fiscal year 2005–2006.” Id. at 76. The General Assembly rejected a bill and a recommendation 
by the Governor that the foundation funding should be increased. Id. at 75–76. Lawmakers 
recognized the political and legal fallout from such inaction; for example, Rep. Jodie Mahony, 
D-El Dorado, said, “The fact we didn’t [raise the per-pupil funding] makes us look bad.” Seth 
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the Masters expressed concern that school superintendents might be 
required to draw upon their reserve balances in order to retain the 
minimum level of performance called for by the General Assembly, 
implying that the state legislature should fund its own goal 
initiatives.87 
The Masters further criticized the State’s policy of placing too 
much financial responsibility for facilities deterioration on the 
individual school districts’ noticing that if a school district needs 
repairs to its facilities, it was probably strapped for cash in the first 
place.88 Additionally, the appropriated funds for the biennium89 “do 
not come close to addressing the state’s public-school facilities 
needs.”90  
The Special Masters berated the State Department of Education, 
asserting that instead of curing the constitutional defects in the school 
system, Department Officials short-sightedly discussed how to spend 
available money.91 “[A]n atmosphere of satisfaction prevailed among 
state officials. They seemed satisfied that the supreme court had 
approved what they had done in 2003 and that they could simply rest 
on the laurel bestowed by the court when it released its mandate after 
our initial report.”92 The Masters concluded by urging the General 
 
DEM.-GAZ., Sept. 13, 2005, at 1A. Mahony also said that the State “probably helped open the 
door for litigation by school districts” by not increasing this amount. Id. 
 87. Masters’ Report II, supra note 3, at 74. This represents a powerful statement in favor 
of state, as opposed to local, financial responsibility to schools, at least to the extent that the 
pertinent goals are set by the state. 
 88. Id. at 79. Again, this underscores the Masters’ desire for the State to take more 
financial responsibility for individual school districts, undercutting arguments of local control. 
 89. $120 million. Id. at 79. 
 90. Id. 
 91. “Rather than seeking to address the needs of the schools . . . the discussions were 
about how to spend available funds.” Id. at 75. In this criticism of the Department, the Masters 
highlight the necessity of fundamental reform as necessary to bring the system into 
constitutional compliance. 
 92. Id. at 77. The “same sense of satisfaction seems to be present” in the school 
consolidation issue, which the Governor advocated as a “major participant” in 2004, as a means 
of achieving greater efficiency in schools. Id. By 2005, the Governor, perhaps conscious of 
greater political ambitions, was “no longer actively participating in” politically difficult efforts 
to consolidate small schools. Id. at 77–78. The Masters additionally criticized the new plan for 
consolidation: “school districts that fall into distress . . . may be consolidated forcibly [by the 
Department of Education] when other attempted cures fail.” Id. This plan results in “even less 
efficiency,” and “it ignores what is happening in the classrooms during the years leading up to 
one or more of the distress conditions . . . . Several of the superintendents who testified before 
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Assembly to “stay the course,” indicating that “infusing the schools” 
with money would not solve the problem.93 
The supreme court adopted this harsh report.94 The court 
concluded that the General Assembly failed to assess what constitutes 
an adequate education95 and additionally failed to prioritize education 
funding.96 Furthermore, the General Assembly “made no effort” to 
determine what adequate funding should be in the first place.97 The 
court stayed the issuance of its mandate until December 1, 2006, to 
allow the General Assembly time to comply with the constitutional 
requirements for education.98  
 
us said that their districts would not be able to avoid fiscal distress if the level of funding were 
not raised . . . .” Id. at 78–79. 
 93. Masters’ Report II, supra note 3, at 82. 
 94. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 01-836, 2005 WL 3436660 (Ark. Dec. 
15, 2005). Once again, the court stressed its proper role in determining the constitutionality of 
the educational funding scheme: “it is also the duty of this court to assure constitutional 
compliance when compliance is challenged and to assure that the . . . constitution is fulfilled.” 
Id. 
 95. The General Assembly has a “continuing duty to assess what constitutes an adequate 
education.” Continuing Adequacy Evaluation Act of 2004, ARK. CODE. ANN. § 10-3-2102 
(2006). See also Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 01-836, 2005 WL 3436660 
(Ark. Dec. 15, 2005). The General Assembly failed to determine per-pupil funding for 
subsequent years, as requited by the Act. Continuing Adequacy Evaluation Act of 2004. 
 96. This was contrary to the requirements the General Assembly imposed on itself. See 
Act of Feb. 12, 2004, 2003 Ark. Acts 108 (an act creating an educational adequacy fund). See 
also Lake View, No. 01-836, 2005 WL 3436660 (Ark. Dec. 15, 2005) (holding “that the 
General Assembly failed to comply with Act 57 and Act 108”); supra note 95 (addressing the 
State’s failure to comply with the Continuing Adequacy Evaluation Act of 2004). 
 97. Lake View, No. 01-836, 2005 WL 3436660 (Ark. Dec. 15, 2005).  
 98. Id. This stay of the mandate is strikingly similar to that of Lake View III. See Lake 
View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 511 (Ark. 2002). The court once again declined to take an active role 
in prescribing remedies in the case:  
[T]his court does not direct the General Assembly to appropriate a specific increase in 
foundation or categorized funding amounts, as requested . . . . Whether an increase is 
necessary is for the General Assembly to determine, after its compliance with existing 
legislation and its assessment of the relevant information necessary for fixing funding 
levels in the current biennium . . . . 
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D. Responses and the 2006 Special Legislative Session 
Various public figures across Arkansas commented on the Special 
Masters’ second report and what the supreme court’s next steps 
should be. Governor Mike Huckabee vehemently denounced the 
Masters’ report.99 Huckabee also expressed deep concern about the 
potential constitutional ramifications of an active role for the state 
supreme court in school funding.100  
The General Assembly met in special session in April 2006, 
passing many bills in response to the Masters’ report.101 Namely, it 
raised teachers’ salaries by 1.6% and provided extra assistance to 
financially failing school districts.102 In November 2006, four school 
districts asked the supreme court not to withdraw its mandate in the 
Lake View case until at least the end of the 2007 legislative session.103 
The court agreed, again appointing Special Masters Jesson and 
Newbern.104 The majority opinion stated the court’s rationale for re-
appointing the Masters: “We wish to emphasize that this court is not 
prejudging whether constitutional compliance has occurred or not. 
We simply have not been provided with the necessary information to 
make an informed determination.”105 The court also disclaimed that 
“it is not this court's intention to monitor the 2007 session of the 
 
 99. Seth Blomeley, Huckabee Slams Masters; Court Overstepping in School-Funding 
Case, He Says, ARK. DEM.-GAZ., Oct. 6, 2005 at 1A. Huckabee characterized the report as 
“convoluted and confusing.” Id. Having defended his efforts and those of the General Assembly 
to increase funding to public schools, Huckabee stated that he was “amazed and appalled [at the 
Masters’ Report]. It’s as if they have ignored your tax money.” Id. Huckabee was referring at 
least in part to the Masters’ wholesale agreement with the superintendents on the foundation 
funding issue. See Masters’ Report II, supra note 85.  
 100. Huckabee said, “I’m confident there will be a united effort in the two branches of 
government to say to the third [the judicial branch] that there are three equal branches of 
government and one does not supersede the other.” Id.  
 101. See Seth Blomeley, Education Bills Can’t Please All, Huckabee Says, ARK. DEM.-
GAZ., Apr. 12, 2006 at 1B. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Michael R. Wickline, 4 Districts Ask for Extension in School Case, ARK. DEM.-
GAZ., Nov. 18, 2006 at 1A. 
 104. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 01-836, 2006 WL 3456468 (Ark. 
2006). 
 105. Id. 
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General Assembly.”106 Justice Hannah’s dissent expressed fatigue 
with the ongoing role of the court:  
This court’s jurisdiction does not reach to supervising or 
overseeing the actions of the other branches of government. 
[T]he basis of the court’s action is simply that this court has 
decided that it will not let go until it is satisfied that an 
adequate school system has been provided by the General 
Assembly . . . [which] is not a basis for jurisdiction.107 
In 2006, Arkansas voters elected Attorney General Mike Beebe as 
Governor.108 Beebe, a supporter of Amendment 74,109 has 
acknowledged and accepted the inherent inequity in the school 
funding scheme: “You’ll always have the potential for inequity . . . 
It’s part of the American ethic to let people excel and go as far as you 
want to go for their own education.”110 Beebe has also advocated that 
the supreme court step aside in the case, stating in November 2006, 
“The legislature and Governor took the necessary steps to address the 
court’s concerns in [the special session], and we will not step back 
from any of the reforms that are being implemented.”111 
E. Similar Litigation in Other Jurisdictions 
State courts across the country have confronted difficult issues 
regarding degrees of judicial oversight of legislative efforts to bring 
the educational funding system into constitutional compliance. In 
many cases, courts directly oversaw the actions of the legislature, 
including the imposition of deadlines for corrective action112 and 
dictating school funding provisions to the legislature.113 The issues 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (Hannah, C.J., dissenting). 
 108. See 2006 General Election and Non-Partisan Judicial Election, Arkansas Secretary of 
State (2007), http://www.arelections.org (click “Results by Contest,” then click “Governor”). 
 109. Seth Blomeley, Beebe Was Major Player in 4 Amendments, ARK. DEM.-GAZ., Aug. 
20, 2006 at 1B. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Wickline, supra note 103. 
 112. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003) (the court 
gave the State one year to come into compliance). 
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these courts faced in the litigation naturally are relevant to the future 
of the Arkansas litigation and their remedial strategies offer 
alternatives to what the Arkansas Supreme Court has already 
prescribed to rectify the unconstitutional situation. 
1. New Jersey 
New Jersey has been embroiled in school litigation for more than 
three decades,114 and the political events surrounding the Abbott v. 
Burke115 litigation resulted in similar constitutional issues for New 
Jersey as Arkansas currently faces.116 Eventually, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court ordered monetary relief in per-pupil expenditures for 
several school districts117 and mandatory entitlements for 
disadvantaged children, including constitutionally-required preschool 
programs.118 When the State balked at enacting legislation to bring 
the educational system into constitutional compliance, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court again intervened, spelling out specific 
substantive educational standards, such as student-teacher ratios.119 
The New Jersey Supreme Court thus assumed an active role in 
prescribing substantive solutions to the state’s unconstitutional 
educational system, effectively compelling the legislature to adopt 
specific measures. 
 
 114. See Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972). In Robinson, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court declared the school funding scheme unconstitutional. The state 
constitution reads in pertinent part: “The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and 
support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the 
children in the State . . . .” N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4. 
 115. Abbott v. Burke, 477 A.2d 1278 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).  
 116. See id. 
 117. Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 440 (N.J. 1997). 
 118. Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998). This development in itself is stunning, 
since the New Jersey Constitution only mandates a “thorough and efficient education” for 
children ages five through eighteen. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4. However, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court demonstrated its willingness to accept studies showing the importance of 
preschool aptitude to future success: “[R]esearch clearly supports the notion that full-day 
kindergarten is an essential part of a thorough and efficient education for the Abbott children.” 
Abbot, 710 A.2d at 461.  
 119. Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000).  















The Nevada Supreme Court invalidated a procedural provision of 
its state constitution to allow its legislature to levy taxes more 
easily.120 The case arose out of the Nevada General Assembly’s 
failure to reach an agreement on either the amount of funding for the 
educational system or the tax increases necessary to fund education 
(after the legislature had appropriated money for non-educational 
governmental functions).121 The Governor of Nevada called two 
separate special sessions to address this issue, neither of which 
produced results sufficient to remedy the constitutionally offensive 
educational system.122 The Governor then sued the state legislature 
for a writ of mandamus to compel it to fulfill its constitutional duties 
with regard to education funding.123 Acknowledging its limitations 
and inherent inability to levy taxes,124 the Nevada Supreme Court 
nonetheless characterized the state constitutional provision requiring 
a two-thirds majority in both Houses125 as “procedural.”126 The court 
invalidated the provision for the purposes of allowing the state 
legislature to fulfill its constitutional requirements regarding 
education.127 The court further ordered the Nevada legislature to raise 
 
 120. Guinn v. Legislature of State, 71 P.3d 1269, 1272–73 (Nev. 2003). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1273. 
 123. Id. at 1272. “The Governor of Nevada has petitioned this court for a writ of 
mandamus declaring the Legislature to be in violation of the Nevada Constitution, and 
compelling the Legislature to fulfill its constitutional duty . . . by a time certain. We agree that 
our intervention is appropriate in this extraordinary circumstance.” Id. 
 124. Id. at 1274. “Clearly, this court has no authority to levy taxes or make appropriations. 
Only our Legislature has been given the constitutional mandate to make appropriations, levy 
taxes, and to balance the state’s budget.” Id.  
 125. “[A]n affirmative vote of not fewer than two-thirds of the members elected to each 
House is necessary to pass a bill or joint resolution which creates, generates, or increases any 
public revenue in any form . . . .” NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 18(2).  
 126. Guinn v. Legislature of State, 71 P.3d 1269, 1275 (Nev. 2003).  
 127. Id. However, the court asserted its proper role in adjudicating the dispute without 
directly levying taxes; “[w]hen constitutional provisions are incompatible with one another or 
are unworkable, or when the enforcement of one prevents the fulfillment of another, this court 
must exercise its judicial function of interpreting the Constitution and attempt to resolve the 
problem.” Id. at 1274.  
When a procedural requirement that is general in nature prevents funding for a basic, 
substantive right, the procedure must yield. Here, the application of the general 
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the necessary taxes to fund the school system on a simple majority 
vote.128 
3. Kansas 
In 2005, the Kansas Supreme Court directly ordered its state 
legislature to increase funding for public education by at least $285 
million for the next biennium under threat of completely cutting off 
funding to public schools through a judicial order,129 in order to bring 
the system into constitutional compliance.130 Predictably, this move 
has attracted criticism, particularly from the state legislature, which 
perceived increasing educational funding as its duty under the state 
constitution.131 The legislature eventually complied with the court’s 
 
body from performing its obligation to give life to the specific substantive educational 
rights enunciated in our Constitution. 
Id. at 1275. 
 128. Id. at 1276. It is also important to note the desperate fiscal situation that faced Nevada 
at the time of the dramatic Guinn decision:  
Nevada now faces an unprecedented budget crisis. Schools have not been funded for 
the upcoming school year. Teachers have not been hired. Educational programs have 
been eliminated. Planning for the academic year is not possible, and the state’s bond 
rating may be jeopardized. This court has been petitioned to resolve the crisis. In light 
of the above circumstances, it appears there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of law, and this court’s intervention is warranted. 
Id. at 1274. 
 129. The possibility of an injunction against the State Treasurer to prevent funding of an 
unconstitutional school system will be discussed subsequently in this Note. See infra notes 174–
75 and accompanying text. 
 130. Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005). Kansas’ constitution calls for a “suitable” 
education, and the Kansas Supreme Court has struck down various funding formulas because of 
a lack of equal protection. Id.  
We conclude, however, that additional funding must be made available for the 2005–
06 school year to assist in meeting the school districts’ immediate needs . . . . 
Specifically, no later than July 1, 2005, for the 2005–06 school year, the legislature 
shall implement a minimum increase of $285 million above the funding level for the 
2004–05 school year, which includes the $142 million presently contemplated in H.B. 
2247. 
Id. at 940.  
 131. For example, the State Senate passed a constitutional amendment aimed at defining 
increasing funding as exclusively the role of the legislature. See Fred Mann & Steve Painter, 
Senate Passes Funding Amendment, THE WICHITA EAGLE, June 25, 2005.  
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order, passing a bill that increased funding in a manner acceptable to 
the court.132 
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
A. The Nature of Possible Future Court Involvement 
According to the Arkansas Supreme Court, education is of 
paramount constitutional importance.133 The level of court 
involvement in the school funding process is the dominant 
controversy facing the State in this arena. The plaintiffs have argued 
that the court should prescribe specific remedies against the State to 
bring the school funding formula into constitutional compliance,134 
but the court has declined to directly impose its vision of school 
reform on the State by commanding specific performance.135 The 
court has, however, offered a general blueprint of constitutional 
requirements, directly urging the State to take a more aggressive 
approach toward curing the defects in the school funding scheme.136 
 
 132. “The present solution may not be ideal. However, it is approved for interim purposes.” 
Montoy v. State, No. 92,032 (Kan. July 8, 2005) (order lifting stay on the expenditure of funds), 
http://www.kscourts.org/ordershowcause7805.htm. 
 133. “That education has been of paramount concern to the citizens of this state since the 
state’s inception is beyond dispute.” Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 492 (Ark. 2002). 
 134. Id. at 479. 
 135. “It is not this court’s intention to monitor or superintend the public schools of this 
state.” Id. at 511. See also Matthews, supra note 34, at 535. 
 136. The Lake View III court set forth its general blueprint of constitutional requirements as 
follows: 
It is the State’s responsibility, first and foremost, to develop forthwith what constitutes 
an adequate education in Arkansas. It is, next, the State’s responsibility to assess, 
evaluate, and monitor, not only the lower elementary grades for English and math 
proficiency, but the entire spectrum of public education across the state to determine 
whether equal educational opportunity for an adequate education is being substantially 
afforded to Arkansas’ school children. It is, finally, the State’s responsibility to know 
how state revenues are being spent and whether true equality in opportunity is being 
achieved. Equality of educational opportunity must include as basic components 
substantially equal curricula, substantially equal facilities, and substantially equal 
equipment for obtaining an adequate education. The key to all this, to repeat, is to 
determine what comprises an adequate education in Arkansas. The State has failed in 
each of these responsibilities. 
Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 500. This language closely parallels that of the charge given to the 
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As the Lake View litigation persists and the supreme court continues 
its involvement, problematic issues of judicially-prescribed remedies 
intensify. Courts around the country have faced similarly difficult 
separation of powers issues regarding proper remedies for school 
funding litigation,137 and their respective approaches provide helpful 
insight into predicting the nature of future court involvement. 
Professor John DiPippa138 warned of court intrusion into the 
legislative sphere, expressing concern that the Arkansas Supreme 
Court has maneuvered itself into a politically difficult position 
because of its inherent lack of enforcement mechanisms.139 Other 
commentators optimistically suggest that these problems of court 
involvement can easily be avoided by constitutional compliance, 
which may simply consist of a seemingly subtle adjustment in 
foundation funding.140 
 
 137. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.D.  
 138. Professor of Constitutional Law and Associate Dean at the University of Arkansas at 
Little Rock’s William H. Bowen School of Law. 
 139. DiPappa stated that adopting wholesale the Special Masters’ latest report would 
amount to having “the [s]upreme [c]ourt ordering the other two branches of government to do 
something.” Laura Kellams, Attorney for Schools Tells State: Don’t Wait Governor: No Rush 
for Special Session, ARK. DEM.-GAZ. Oct. 5, 2005 at 1A, 9A. DiPappa continued, describing a 
possible scenario of the executive and legislative branches failing to comply with future orders 
by the Arkansas Supreme Court regarding education: “The other two branches could say, ‘No 
thank you.’ The court really can’t do anything about it . . . [which] shows you what a difficult 
position the [s]upreme [c]ourt has put itself in.” Id. This “no thank you” is illustrated by Sen. 
Jim Argue, D-Little Rock, who suggested possible future legislative noncompliance with such a 
court order: “It’s in the Legislature’s authority to expend funds . . . . I don’t think the 
Legislature is ever going to concede that that’s a shared responsibility with the court.” Seth 
Blomeley, Legislature Didn’t Help Its Own Case on School Funding, Lawmaker Says, ARK. 
DEM.-GAZ., Sept. 13, 2005 at 1A, 2A. Such frustration at the court’s role in the matter is 
perhaps best embodied by a now-infamous April 2005 e-mail by Assistant Attorney General 
Tim Gauger, suggesting that the state constitution should be amended to strike the “adequate” 
requirement. See Seth Blomeley, E-Mails Point to Frustration about School-Funding Case; 
Correspondence Submitted to Masters, ARK. DEM.-GAZ., Aug. 31, 2005. However, the 
seriousness of this e-mail has been questioned, and no politician to date has publicly advocated 
to amend the constitution in this manner. Id. 
 140. See Gary W. Ritter, Joshua H. Barnett & Ginny Blankenship, Editorial, Arkansas’ 
School Finance Reform on the Right Path, ARK. DEM.-GAZ., Oct. 9, 2005 at 3J. These authors, 
after presenting their case for how the General Assembly has effectively initiated meaningful 
reforms in Arkansas’s education system, argue that “While the headlines say ‘system ruled 
inadequate,’ people must understand that, with a little tinkering – perhaps simply a fair inflation 
adjustment – Arkansas can be on the right path to creating an adequate and equitable education 
system.” Id. This optimism seemingly flies in the face of the dismal outlook outlined by the 
supreme court in its most recent opinion. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, No. 
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B. Proposed Legislative and Judicial Solutions 
The Arkansas Supreme Court is certainly aware of the controversy 
surrounding its appropriate function, but it remains dedicated to 
overseeing efforts to bring the educational system into constitutional 
compliance.141 Increased court involvement, however, may harm the 
prestige of the court and consequently delay tangible changes in the 
educational system.142 Even David Matthews, an attorney for two 
school districts in the litigation,143 has voiced caution at the 
possibility of specific remedies ordered by the court.144 However, 
non-participation by the court is not a plausible alternative because 
decreased judicial participation in the process will likely lull 
lawmakers into a sense of complacency and unwillingness to face 
difficult issues. Even though the court has been active in changing 
Arkansas’ educational funding system, the onus must be upon the 
other two branches of State Government to avoid inventive judicial 
sanctions145 by taking strides to achieve perpetual constitutional 
compliance.146 The State must conceive and implement a system 
whereby Arkansas’ pupils receive adequate and equal educational 
opportunities, and, accordingly, the proposals set forth in this Note 
will be grouped loosely under those two categories. Finally, this Note 
will analyze the appropriateness of the court’s future role absent 
constitutionally sufficient future legislation. 
 
01-836, 2005 WL 3436660 (Ark. Dec. 15, 2005).  
 141. “Nevertheless, should constitutional dictates not be followed, as interpreted by this 
court, we will have no hesitancy in reviewing the constitutionality of the state’s school-funding 
system once again in an appropriate case.” Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 511 (Ark. 2002). 
 142. Naturally, the court’s ability to compel the other branches of government to action on 
the education issue is dependent at least in part on its political prestige. 
 143. Rogers School District No. 30 and Bentonville School District No. 6. Matthews, supra 
note 34, at 541 n.a1. 
 144. Matthews “do[es] not see [specific remedies] as the trial court’s, or [the supreme] 
court’s, function . . . . Development of the necessary educational programs and the 
implementation of the same falls more within the bailiwick of the General Assembly and the 
Department of Education.” Id. at 535 (citing Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 507). 
 145. Feasible options available to the court, a coequal partner with the other two branches 
of government, will be discussed subsequently in this Note. See infra Part III.D. 
 146. Proposals to amend the constitution to prevent the court from making determinations 
on the constitutionality of the public school system undercuts the overall spirit of the State’s 
















The lack of a uniform “adequacy” standard throughout State 
Government hampers efforts to achieve adequacy in the first place.147 
The supreme court applauded legislative efforts to define adequacy 
and chided the State Department of Education for failing to do the 
same.148 The General Assembly should take decisive steps towards 
establishing a statewide adequacy standard.149 The adequacy 
definition should contain specific curriculum, facilities, and teacher 
salary criteria. Additionally, the definition should be binding on all 
branches of State Government, including the Department of 
Education.150 
Standardized testing is a key objective indicator for whether 
adequate standards are being maintained in the State’s school 
districts. The General Assembly should pass a bill requiring 
mandatory yearly testing of elementary-aged pupils, requiring 
remedial summer schoolwork or being held back a grade for those 
students who fail. This will provide important data indicating which 
school districts are failing at adequately educating children, and 
provide the State Department of Education with an opportunity to 
propose solutions for that particular school district to live up to the 
adequacy requirements.151  
 
 147. The Arkansas Supreme Court has refused to define adequacy; “We offer no 
conclusion on the precise definition of an adequate education as we deem that to be a matter 
better left to the General Assembly and to the State Department of Education.” Lake View Sch. 
Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ark. 2004). 
 148. “Despite [a directive from the General Assembly], nothing has been done by the 
Department of Education, and seven years have passed.” Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 486. 
 149. A possible solution is the appointment of an “adequacy standard task force,” which 
would review recommendations from various state departments, the Governor’s office, school 
superintendents, officials from other states, and perhaps a private firm conducting an adequacy 
study. Based on its findings, the task force should set out in clear, specific writing an adequacy 
standard for the State to follow. The Rose factors are a good start in any attempt to define 
adequacy. See supra note 57. 
 150. Presumably, a legislative effort to “force” the Department to adopt an adequacy 
standard is more politically and constitutionally desirable than a similar effort initiated by the 
judiciary. 
 151. State funding is essential in such an effort. Financially failing school districts should 
not be forced to pay the costs of reeducating failing children; these costs should be assumed by 
the General Assembly. 















A more accurate measure of equity in educational opportunities 
among the State public school districts will help ensure the perpetual 
success of the adequacy goals.152 Equity is a particularly difficult 
issue given the inherent differences in cost of living and property 
value among school districts.153 As such, the era of exclusive “local 
control” of school finance must come to an end in order to increase 
uniformity in educational funding throughout the State.154 The State 
Government simply must take a more active role in school funding, 
which will result not only in more concentrated power in Little Rock, 
but also better educational opportunities.155 
The amount of per-pupil expenditures should be aggressively 
increased, but this is only half of the concern. The State should also 
provide supplemental funds for school districts that cannot raise tax 
money on the same level as the wealthier school districts.156 The goal 
of such a fund should be to bring every school district in the State up 
to a minimum per-pupil expenditure level, calculated at 50% of the 
difference between the average per-pupil expenditures of the top 15% 
of school districts and the lowest level per-pupil expenditures in the 
State. This fund should be a high priority,157 and surplus State 
revenues could be deposited into this fund to ensure its perpetual 
 
 152. “[T]here is considerable overlap between the issue of whether a school-funding 
system is inadequate and whether it is inequitable. Deficiencies in certain public schools in 
certain school districts can sustain a finding of inadequacy but also, when compared to other 
schools in other districts, a finding of inequality.” Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 496. 
 153. The equity issue is also more difficult politically, since “forcing” districts to offer 
roughly equal educational opportunities compared with one another essentially undermines the 
concept of local control in education. 
 154. Clearly, Amendment 74 and its authorization of school districts raising their own 
funds through increased millages must fit in this framework. 
 155. The equity proposals outlined in this Note should all occur with accountability 
schemes, so the State can monitor how money is spent by individual school districts. This will 
enhance the State’s role as the proper guardian of equity in educational opportunity. 
 156. This cannot be a 100% match. If money from citizens throughout the State was used 
to supplement those school districts which had not passed local tax increases, no school district 
would have an incentive to use its own tax base to raise money past the minimum required by 
Amendment 74.  
 157. Educational funding in general should be high priority. “That education has been of 
paramount concern to the citizens of this state since the state’s inception is beyond dispute.” 












2007]  The Judiciary in AR Education 271 
 
 
viability. Such a system would reduce the likelihood of a large gap 
between rich and poor school districts.158  
C. Equality in Facilities, Curriculum, Equipment, and Teacher 
Salaries 
The Arkansas Supreme Court has made it clear that equalizing 
per-pupil expenditures by itself is not enough to meet the 
constitutional equity requirements; equality in facilities, curriculum, 
and equipment among school districts is also necessary.159 Identifying 
the districts with the poorest educational opportunities is the best way 
to start an equalization scheme. Aggressive state funding for 
improved facilities and educational equipment in these problematic 
districts is necessary to afford them an opportunity to provide equal 
educational opportunities with other districts throughout the state. It 
is likely that forced consolidation, despite its political difficulties, 
will necessarily improve curriculum.160 Alternatively, or in 
combination with a state-initiated consolidation scheme, state grants 
for textbooks for honors and Advanced Placement courses would be a 
step in the right direction towards equalizing educational 
opportunities in the curriculum offered.161 
The teacher salary issue is complex162 and should be approached 
similarly to the per-pupil expenditure equalizing scheme as discussed 
above. First, the General Assembly should raise teacher salaries 
across the board, with particular attention to the lowest teacher 
 
 158. Additionally, a cost of living calculation may be beneficial. For example, a school 
district with high per-pupil expenditures which also happens to have a high cost of living 
should have its per-pupil expenditure figure adjusted downwards for purposes of calculating the 
proper funding level for disadvantaged school districts in this scheme. 
 159. See Lake View III, 91. S.W.3d at 497–500 (discussing the need for increased equality 
in facilities, curriculum, educational equipment, and teachers’ salaries). 
 160. More students in an individual school district creates more demand for particular 
advanced classes. 
 161. It will also have the desired effect of better preparing students for college, a problem 
that loomed large in Lake View. See Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 488 (discussing the 
widespread need for remediation in college as a factor in its finding of inadequacy in 
education). 
 162. “The task of closing the gap, and thus the task of addressing the problem of teacher 
migration among Arkansas school districts, will at least require more imagination than has been 
demonstrated by the state or by the other parties and intervenors thus far.” Masters’ Report I, 
supra note 3, at 6. 
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salaries. Second, the General Assembly should enact a fund designed 
to subsidize teacher salaries in poor districts.163 Additionally, a 
similar calculation to the above proposal of per-pupil expenditures 
should occur regarding teacher salaries, representing an attempt to 
achieve a greater degree of equity in this area among school districts 
in the state.164  
D. The Future of the Court’s Role 
It is unclear at best whether the General Assembly will enact 
appropriate steps to guarantee an adequate and equitable education 
system in Arkansas. Even so, the Arkansas Supreme Court must be 
prepared to exercise caution with its future role in the funding 
litigation, even in the absence of innovative and constitutionally 
effective political solutions.165 The court’s inherent lack of 
enforcement mechanisms is a serious limitation. The prestige of the 
court enjoys is its most effective vehicle for bringing the other 
branches of government into constitutional compliance in education. 
1. Specific Remedies 
So far, the Arkansas Supreme Court has not, and apparently will 
not, order specific remedies for constitutional defects in education.166 
 
 163. Indeed, it would be short-sighted and irresponsible for the State to require raising 
teachers’ salaries without taking on much of the responsibility for funding them.  
 164. For example, lessening the gap between the highest districts’ teachers’ salaries for 
various experience levels and the lowest would achieve greater equity.  
 165. This will undoubtedly cause tension between the active judicial steps necessary to 
ensure constitutional compliance and the court’s stated intention “[not] to monitor or 
superintend the public schools of this state. Nevertheless, . . . we will have no hesitancy in 
reviewing the constitutionality of the state’s school-funding system once again in an appropriate 
case.” Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 511 (Ark. 2002). 
 166. The Arkansas Supreme Court appears unwilling to go as far as the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, for example. Compare Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 507 (asserting that it is the 
General Assembly’s role to develop and implement new educational programs to comply with 
the constitution) with Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82, 101 (N.J. 2000) (ordering the 
implementation of a preschool program by a time certain). For further discussion of the New 
Jersey litigation, see supra notes 114–19 and accompanying text. The Lake View III court did 
not view specific remedies as a proper function of the judiciary. Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 
507. Rather, the court opined that “[d]evelopment of the necessary educational programs and 
the implementation of the same falls more within the bailiwick of the General Assembly and the 
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For example, the court explicitly declined to require a mandatory 
preschool program or other substantive educational programs.167 
Additionally, the Arkansas Supreme Court has declined to set forth 
specific definitions of adequacy or specific funding requirements in 
any area.168 In short, it appears that the supreme court will continue to 
wait and see what steps the General Assembly and the State 
Department of Education will take in the future before assuming a 
more active role. Even if the legislative and executive branches fail at 
bringing the system into constitutional compliance, however, the 
court should avoid specific remedies in an effort to offend the 
appropriate separation of powers. 
2. “Forcing” the General Assembly to Raise Taxes 
The supreme court could conceivably take a more aggressive role 
and directly affect the levying of taxes.169 It is not out of the question 
that in some future, unforeseen budget crisis,170 that Arkansas’ 
requirement of a three-fourths affirmative vote of both Houses to 
raise taxes171 could be temporarily overruled by the supreme court.172 
 
 167. See Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 511 (leaving substantive changes in the educational to 
the discretion of the General Assembly). 
 168. Id. (ordering the Arkansas Department of Education and the General Assembly to 
formulate a statewide adequacy definition and declining to offer specificity on the substance of 
this definition). In the continuing absence of a supreme court definition of “adequacy,” the State 
Department of Education must take further steps to define the term. See supra note 148 and 
accompanying text. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s treatment of specific remedies to bring its 
educational system into compliance illustrates the essential point that the Arkansas Supreme 
Court may order specific remedies to bring the educational system into constitutional 
compliance. See Abbott, 748 A.2d at 101 (ordering the implementation of a preschool program 
by a time certain).  
 169. See, e.g., Guinn v. Legislature of the State, 71 P.3d 1269, 1274–75 (Nev. 2003) 
(invalidating a constitutional provision for a two-thirds majority requirement to raise taxes to 
make it easier for the Nevada legislature to fund education). For a further explanation of the 
Guinn decision, see supra notes 120–28 and accompanying text. 
 170. Nevada was facing a severe budget crisis at the time of the Guinn decision. Guinn, 71 
P.3d at 1274. 
 171. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 38 (as amended by ARK. CONST. amend. XIX). 
 172. See Matthews, supra note 34, at 539. Matthews, an attorney for two school districts in 
the Lake View litigation, strongly advocates increased court involvement. But even he admits 
that a court decision invalidating the three-fourths requirement “would create a significant 
separation of powers problem that can be avoided if the General Assembly acts in a timely 
fashion.” Id. See also Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1274 (invalidating a similar constitutional provision for 
the purposes of raising taxes to fund education). 











274 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 25:245 
 
 
The court, however, is currently reluctant to set forth specific 
standards for the legislature to follow.173 Such a course would be 
politically disastrous. Ordering the State to provide more money for 
education and directly affecting the methods of taxing individuals are 
two different matters. The court should not intrude on the 
legislature’s prerogative in this manner, and should prescribe, at 
most, only realistic remedies within the General Assembly’s power to 
enforce.  
3. Injunction Against the State Treasurer 
The court could attempt to force the General Assembly into action 
by issuing an injunction against the State Treasurer to prevent the 
funding of an unconstitutional system.174 The court, however, seems 
unwilling to explicitly set forth what is necessary to bring the system 
into constitutional compliance.175 Thus, such an order is unlikely or, 
at most, far in the future. Moreover, the court should avoid such an 
option, as an injunction would immediately bring the its role in the 
funding scheme into a controversial spotlight. Ordering an injunction 
cannot be ruled out, however, if the litigation and insufficient 
legislative responses persist. 
 
 173. Also, the inherent separation of powers difficulties of such a decision mitigate against 
its probability. However, the important precedent set forth by the Nevada Supreme Court could 
lend great weight and credibility to a similar decision in Arkansas. See Guinn, 71 P.3d 1269. 
 174. See Montoy v. Kansas, 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005) (threatening an injunction against 
the State Treasurer if certain funding requirements are not met). Indeed, it is within the court’s 
power to freeze the disbursement of State funds to public schools, effectively paralyzing the 
statewide educational system, to force lawmakers to bring the system into constitutional 
compliance. David Matthews suggested this possibility: 
Because of the primacy of education in the Arkansas Constitution, appropriations for 
non-constitutionally mandated functions are suspect in the face of an education system 
that is not funded adequately. Spending money on non-constitutionally mandated 
functions while education is left lacking will surely give rise to an illegal exaction 
suit . . . . A mandatory injunction ordering the State Treasurer to ‘adequately’ fund the 
education system seems a likely prospective remedy. 
Matthews, supra note 34, at 540 (emphasis added). “[A]lmost any misuse or mishandling of 
public funds may be challenged by a taxpayer action.” Starnes v. Sadler, 372 S.W.2d 585, 587 
(Ark. 1963). 
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Overall, the court should tread very carefully before and while 
ordering any specific remedies. The litigation is settling into a 
familiar and destructive pattern: a judicial declaration of 
unconstitutionality, followed by insufficient legislative and 
administrative responses, followed by Special Masters confirming the 
insufficiency of these responses, followed by the supreme court 
agreeing with the Special Masters and giving the State time to 
respond insufficiently again. The court should continue to avoid 
adopting coercive measures to force the General Assembly into 
immediate action. Instead, the court’s future role should be tempered 
with caution. The court should continue monitoring the General 
Assembly, but remove any threat of intruding on its constitutional 
role in government. This will help ensure that the task of providing 
an adequate and equitable education in Arkansas will be the job of 
the entire State Government, not just the dictation of the supreme 
court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Arkansas faces the daunting task of bringing its educational 
system into constitutional compliance as soon as possible. The work 
remaining is difficult, and specific, fundamental changes towards 
achieving tangible results to ameliorate the inadequate and 
inequitable funding scheme are needed. The Arkansas Supreme Court 
will certainly remain involved in this process. The nature of that 
involvement will not only dictate the substantive outcome of the 
litigation and progress towards constitutionality, but it will also 
fundamentally define the court’s role in similar disputes in years to 
come. The Lake View litigation represents a fundamental shift away 
from the core concept of local control over education. The time has 
come for the State to take a more active and hands-on role in 
education the pupils of Arkansas, and the supreme court’s leadership 
must be followed by the other two branches of State Government. 
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